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 Abstract 
The Treaty of Waitangi has repeatedly been affirmed as New Zealand’s founding 
document, yet our constitutional arrangements rest on the untrammelled principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. This paper argues that the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is contrary to the sharing of powers provided for in the Treaty, as it 
concentrates ultimate law-making authority in one body. New Zealand’s constitutional 
history is canvassed briefly, with a specific focus on the Treaty and the basis of British 
Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over New Zealand. It is noted that the current place of 
the Treaty within New Zealand’s constitution is within the vast powers of parliament  - 
the Treaty can only have legal effect to the extent that Parliament provides for. After 
looking at examples from statute and common law it is concluded that, rather than 
limiting parliamentary sovereignty, the current approach ultimately reinforces the 
absolute and indivisible power of parliament. As such, it is a barrier to a Treaty 
partnership between the Crown and Maori. To truly give effect to the Treaty a change in 
the way in which public power in New Zealand is configured and exercised is necessary. 
Three models for Treaty-based constitutional reform are therefore discussed. The current 
constitutional review provides Iwi and the Crown with an opportunity to look beyond the 
confines of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and forge a unique constitutional 
system that gives effect to the Treaty as New Zealand’s founding document.  
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,950 words. 
 
 
Subjects and Topics 
Parliamentary Sovereignty-Treaty of Waitangi-Constitutional Law-
Constitutional Review 
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I Introduction  
As aptly put by Sir Robin Cooke, “…a nation cannot cast adrift from its own 
foundations”.1  The Treaty of Waitangi, or Te Tiriti o Waitangi, has repeatedly been 
affirmed as New Zealand’s founding document, 2  a document of the “greatest 
constitutional importance”.3 Yet New Zealand’s constitution rests not on the exchange of 
promises between two sovereign peoples contained in the Treaty, but on the untrammeled 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, which locates ultimate law-making authority in 
the New Zealand Parliament. Famously conceptualised by Albert Venn Dicey as the 
unrestricted right of Parliament to “make or unmake any law it sees fit”,4 the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty is introduced unquestioned to first year law students and is 
maintained as the starting point for any constitutional conversation.  
 
The location of absolute and indivisible sovereignty in Parliament sits at loggerheads 
with the distribution of powers provided for in Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Maori text of the 
Treaty) in which Maori ceded the power to govern to the British Crown in return for the 
protection of their chiefly authority and rights to their lands and other taonga. As argued 
by some commentators, the Treaty is best understood, not as an agreement for the cession 
of sovereignty but as a template for a redistribution of powers between the Crown and 
Maori. 5  The relationship between the Crown and Maori is described as akin to a 
partnership.6 However, inherent in the notion of a partnership is a balance of powers 
where decisions are reached through negotiation. Thus in practice, Crown-Maori relations 
resemble more of a paternalistic relationship, with one party imposing its will on, and 
making decisions for, the other. Past experience makes clear the inability of people of one 
culture to develop and implement policies for people of another culture and “get it 
                                                 
1 Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 at 308-309 [Sealords 
case]. 
2 Constitutional Advisory Panel “New Zealand’s Constitution: The Conversation So Far” (Ministry of 
Justice, Sept 2012) at 35. 
3  New Zealand Māori Council v The Attorney- General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 at 516 per Woolf LJ 
[Broadcasting Assets case] 
4 A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1 ed, MacMillan, London, 1885; 10 
ed, MacMillan, London, 1959). 
5 Joe Williams “Not Ceded but Redistributed” in William Renwick (ed) Sovereignty and Indigenous Rights: 
The Treaty of Waitangi in International Contexts (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1991) at 193 [Joe 
Williams “Not Ceded but Redistributed”]. 
6 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
5  
 
right”.7 Therefore, as aptly put by Whatarangi Winiata, what New Zealand needs is not 
more “Pakeha-inspired policies” but a constitutional transformation that “ensures that the 
two partners can grow within their respective cultures and value systems and can make 
decisions together as full partners”.8  
 
In 2008 the National Party and the Maori Party agreed to establish an independent group 
to consider constitutional issues, from electoral matters to the nature Crown-Maori 
relations.9 The initial stage of the consideration process began in May 2012 with the 
establishment of the Constitutional Advisory Panel, charged with preparing and 
commissioning opinion pieces on the topics in consideration and creating a forum for 
New Zealander’s to share information and ideas on those topics. 10  One of the 
fundamental questions the Panel endeavors to address is the role that the Treaty of 
Waitangi or Te Tiriti o Waitangi should have within New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements. Notably absent from the Panel’s background document said to be 
informing the constitutional conversation was any discussion of the future of 
parliamentary sovereignty in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, despite its 
seemingly obvious incompatibility with the guarantee of Maori tino rangatiratanga in the 
Maori text of the Treaty. If parliamentary sovereignty is maintained as the starting point 
for a constitutional conversation around the place of the Treaty of Waitangi/ Tiriti o 
Waitangi in New Zealand’s governance structure, the opportunity for any real 
constitutional transformation is blocked.  
 
With the last of historical claims being settled New Zealand is sailing into unchartered 
territory – the post-settlement era. A new type of relationship must develop between the 
Crown and Maori, with the focus shifting from past injustices to future development.11 
However, in order to move forward we need to create an environment that is conducive to 
change. It is argued that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty will prevent the 
development of an effective partnership between the Crown and Maori because it places 
all the power in the hands of one party (Parliament) at the expense of the other (Maori). 
As argued by Moana Jackson, the Treaty of Waitangi is the foundation “upon which a 
proper and just constitutional relationship between [Maori] and the crown was meant to 
                                                 
7  Whatarangi Winiata “Reducing the Socioeconomic Disparities in Housing, Employment Health and 
Education” (1998) TWM < http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/~sai/MSoln_Win.html> at 1. 
8 At 1.  
9 Relationship and Confidence and Supply Agreement (16 November 2008). 
10 Consideration of Constitutional Issues: Terms of Reference (May 2012) at 3. 
11 Mason Durie “Pae Mana Waitangi and the Evolving State” (Massey University Te Mata O Te Tau 
Lecture Series 2009 “The Paerangi Lectures” Maori Horizons 2020 and Beyond, 14 July 2009) at 4. 
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be established in the first place”.12 To truly give effect to the Treaty, which is primarily 
about a redistribution of power,13 we need to change the way in which public power in 
New Zealand is configured and exercised. The issues raised are complex and the path to 
reform may not be smooth sailing, however, the current constitutional review provides 
Iwi and the Crown with an opportunity to look beyond the confines of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and forge a unique constitutional system that gives effect to 
the Treaty as New Zealand’s founding document.  
 
Part I of this paper will discuss the nature of the Diceyan conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty and briefly outline the history of the Treaty of Waitangi and parliamentary 
sovereignty in New Zealand. In Part II the tension between parliamentary sovereignty and 
the Treaty and their inability to co-exist will be discussed. Examples from case law and 
legislation will be canvassed in order to illustrate the inadequacy of the current attempts 
that seek to give effect to the Treaty within the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The final part of this paper will look at possible options for a Treaty-based constitution 
with the aim of opening up wider discussion around the area of constitutional reform. 
There is not necessarily one correct answer, but by first unraveling and removing the 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty, a way forward is a lot easier to navigate.  
 
II The Treaty of Waitangi and Parliamentary Sovereignty in New Zealand  
New Zealand’s constitutional history is unique and by no means straightforward. 
Knowledge of this history is an essential precursor to an informed constitutional 
conversation.14 However, the scope of this essay is necessarily confined to a brief outline 
of New Zealand’s constitutional history in light of the pivotal issue – the issue of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.15  
                                                 
12 An Interview with Moana Jackson “Constitutional Transformation” Malcolm Mulholland and Veronica 
Tawhai (eds) Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional Change (Huia Publishers, 
Wellington, 2010) 325 at 329. 
13 Joe Williams “Not Ceded but Redistributed”, above n 5 at 190. 
14 See Dr Susan Healy’s contribution to the Constitutional Advisory Panel where she highlights the fact the 
Panel’s Backgrounder lacks information regarding the history of New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements, ignores the constitutional arrangements of the Maori world and fails to mention the 
Declaration of Independence. Healy argues this prevents an informed constitutional conversation.  
15 For more information about New Zealand’s constitutional history see Claudia Orange The Treaty of 
Waitangi (Bridget Williams Books Limited, Wellington, 1987), Robert Consedine and Joanna Consedine 
Healing Our History: The Challenge of the Treaty of Waitangi (Penguin Books, London, 2012), Matthew S 
R Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2008), Andrew Sharp Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in 
New Zealand since the 1970s (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997). 
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A The Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty of Waitangi or Te Tiriti o Waitangi, as the founding document of New 
Zealand, is the original legal basis on which Pakeha gained the right to live in the 
country.16 Given the Treaty’s foundational status, it is the proper starting point for any 
discussion about constitutional reform. The Treaty is perhaps best summarised as an 
agreement for the distribution of power between the two parties who signed it: the British 
Crown and the Maori.17 As such, the Treaty was and is a “blueprint” for a bicultural 
nation.18 
 
It is important to highlight at the outset that the Treaty was an agreement between two 
sovereign and independent peoples. In 1835 thirty-four Rangatira signed He 
Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni, a Declaration of Independence, restating 
their inherent independence and reaffirming that “all sovereign power and authority 
within the territories of the United Tribes of New Zealand” resided “entirely and 
exclusively in the hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes in collective capacity”. 19 
Furthermore, the document provided that the Rangatira:20  
 
…will not permit any legislative authority separate from themselves in their 
collective capacity to exist, nor any function of government to be exercised within 
the said territories, unless by persons appointed by them, and acting under the 
authority of laws regularly enacted by them in Congress assembled. 
 
Charged with instructions from Lord Normanby, Captain William Hobson, a 
representative of the British Monarch set about acquiring sovereignty over ‘the whole or 
any parts’ of New Zealand that the Maori wished to cede. The Treaty was compiled in 
both English and te reo Maori, and the significant differences between the two 
                                                 
16 Constitutional Advisory Panel “New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on a Conversation” (Ministry of 
Justice, November 2013) at 11; Margaret Mutu “Constitutional Intentions: The Treaty of Waitangi Texts” 
in Malcolm Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (eds) Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and 
Constitutional Change (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2010) 13 at 14. 
17  Malcolm Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (eds) Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and 
Constitutional Change (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2010) 1. 
18 Bronwyn Campbell “Te Titiri O Waitangi: A Blueprint for the Future” in Huia Tomlins-Jahnke and 
Malcolm Mullholland (eds) Mana Tangata: Politics of Empowerment (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2011) 
45 at 45 [Bronwyn Campbell “Te Titiri O Waitangi: A Blueprint for the Future”]. 
19 He Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (A Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand) 
1835, art 2. 
20 He Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (A Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand) 
1835, art 2. 
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translations have been a source of contention. Hobson prepared the English text of the 
Treaty, which was then translated overnight into te reo Maori by resident missionary 
Henry Williams and his son Edward, neither of whom were experts in Maori dialect.21 It 
is unsurprising then that historians have referred to the Treaty as being “hastily and 
inexpertly drawn up, ambitious, and contradictory in content”.22 Around 40 Rangatira 
(Maori Chiefs) signed the Maori text of the Treaty on the 6 February 1840, and by the end 
of the year over 500 Maori had signed the Treaty.  
 
Under the English translation of the Treaty, Maori ceded “[A]ll the rights and powers of 
sovereignty which the… Confederation or individual chiefs respectively exercise or 
possess, or may be supposed to exercise or possess over the respective territories as the 
sole sovereigns thereof.” 23  In exchange, the British Crown guaranteed Maori “full, 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and 
other properties”.24 However, under the Maori text (Te Tiriti o Waitangi) Maori did not 
cede “sovereignty” to the British Crown. The word “sovereignty” is an English term and 
has no equivalent in Maori, with the idea of a people being under the control of a single 
individual being a foreign concept to Maori culture.25 The word “rangatiratanga” (which 
can be roughly translated in English to chieftainship), as used in He Wakaputanga o te 
Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni in 1835 would have been a closer approximation to 
“sovereignty”. Instead, under article one Maori granted the British Crown “kawanatanga” 
(governorship), a power that is subordinate to rangatiratanga.26  
 
The translation of article two of Te Tiriti again gives rise to ambiguities. In exchange for 
kawanatanga, the Maori retain “tino rangatiratanga”. The meaning of tino rangatiratanga 
is the subject of ongoing debate, but its closest English translation is self-determination.27 
This ambiguity becomes relevant when looking at models for constitutional reform – in 
particular whether constitutional arrangements should be seen as shaped by or flowing 
from the Treaty. In the case of the former, the power of kawanatanga would be seen as 
superior to tino rangatiratanga. Under the latter view, the Treaty established “parallel 
                                                 
21 Claudia Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Bridget Williams Books Limited, Wellington, 1987) at 39 
[Orange The Treaty of Waitangi]. 
22 Ruth Ross “Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations” (1972) 6 NZJH 139 at 154. 
23 Treaty of Waitangi 1840, art 1. 
24 Treaty of Waitangi 1840, art 2. 
25 Charles Hawksley and Richard Howson “Tino Rangatiratanga and Mana Motuhake: Nation, State and 
Self-Determination in Aotearoa New Zealand” (2011) 7 AlterNative 246 at 250 [Hawksley and Howson 
“Tino Rangatiratanga and Mana Motuhake”]. 
26 Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840, art 1. For English translation of Maori text see IH Kawharu Waitangi: Maori 
and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989). 
27 Hawksley and Howson “Tino Rangatiratanga and Mana Motuhake”, above n 25 at 250. 
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paths of power under a single nation state” with neither party sovereign over the other.28 
The translation of article three has not given rise to dispute, it simply provides for the 
extension of all the rights and privileges of British citizens to Maori.29 
 
Parliament in its sovereign capacity has required the Waitangi Tribunal to have regard to 
both Treaty texts when exercising its functions.30 However, following the doctrine of 
contra proferentum, the interpretation of any ambiguities in the terms or provisions of a 
document must be interpreted against the drafter.31 Also of interest is a series of decisions 
from the Supreme Court in Canada in the context of indigenous rights holding that 
“treaties should be liberally construed and ambiguities or doubtful expressions should be 
resolved in favour of the Aboriginal signatories”. 32  The fact that it was the Maori 
translation that was read out at by Hobson at Waitangi when the first Rangatira signed, 
and that all but 39 Maori signatories signed this translation further supports Te Tiriti 
taking precedence over its English counterpart. 
 
Despite heated debate around the differences between the provisions in the Treaty and Te 
Titiri, one provision has remained virtually untouchable – the right to sovereignty of the 
British Crown. Thus, right from the beginning it becomes clear that the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in the context of New Zealand runs into legitimacy issues. 
What the Treaty provided for was a redistribution of power – yet what occurred was a 
complete removal of power from Maori, for that power to then vest in one supreme law-
making body, to which Maori were then and are still now subjected. Paul McHugh refers 
to the story of Crown sovereignty in New Zealand as “one of the struggle to inject a 
modern sense of historical legitimacy into a set of constitutional arrangements built upon 
a contrary foundation.”33 
 
                                                 
28 Mason Durie “Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination” (Oxford University 
Press, Wellington, 1998) at 177 [Mason Durie “Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-
Determination”]. 
29 Treaty of Waitangi 1840, art 3. 
30 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 5(2). 
31 Bronwyn Campbell “Te Titiri O Waitangi: A Blueprint for the Future”, above n 18 at 51. 
32 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, Simon v. The Queen [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 387, R. v. Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025. 
33  PG McHugh “Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown Sovereignty in New Zealand” (2002) 52 
University of Toronto Law Journal 69 at 72 [PG McHugh “Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown 
Sovereignty in New Zealand”]. 
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If the basis for absolute parliamentary sovereignty cannot be found in the nation’s 
founding document, when exactly did the doctrine drift into New Zealand shores? The 
next section examines the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in more detail and looks 
for the basis of its application in New Zealand.  
B The Orthodox Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
In line with the orthodox Diceyan formulation, “sovereignty” under English law referred 
to the absolute, unitary and indivisible authority of the British Crown over its territories.34 
The Diceyan conception of parliamentary sovereignty that has gripped those in the legal 
profession is concisely summarised by Paul McHugh:35  
 
The Crown’s sovereignty is regarded as absolute, unitary and unaccountable, the 
ultimate expression of this supreme power being the enactment of legislation (the 
Crown in parliament). Being absolute, this sovereignty is viewed as undivided and 
indivisible―it can never be shared with any other sovereign entity. It is also 
unaccountable. The Courts will recognise no law-giving power other than the Crown 
and will not call the sovereign to account for the exercise of its legislative power.  
 
The origins of parliamentary sovereignty have been the subject of some debate – can 
Parliamentary sovereignty be viewed as the great Leviathan expounded by Hobbes,36 or, 
as Goldsworthy argued, do the roots of the doctrine go deeper than 17th and 18th century 
political theory? 37  Either way, the tenets of the doctrine are clear: Parliament has 
absolute, indivisible and unquestionable law-making power. 
 
McHugh argues that, constitutionally speaking, New Zealand has taken the Hobbesian 
position in which the sovereign power of parliament is viewed as Leviathan, the great sea 
monster in Job, Chapter 41 whom none would ‘dare stir … up’.38 For Hobbes, the vast 
rights and powers of the sovereign were ‘incommunicable and inseparable’.39 The people 
were not ‘citizens’ but ‘subjects’ and they were deemed to have authorised this 
subjection. Subjects could be treated badly, but could not be treated unjustly, as the word 
                                                 
34 Robert Consedine and Joanna Consedine Healing Our History: The Challenge of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Penguin Books, London, 2012) at 89-90. 
35 P McHugh “The legal and constitutional position of the Crown in resource management” in R. Howitt, J. 
Connell & P. Hirsch (Eds.). Resources, nations and indigenous peoples. (Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1996) at 302. 
36 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1651). 
37 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy “Is Parliament Sovereign? Recent Challenges to the Doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty” (2005) 3 NZJPIL 7 [Jeffrey Goldsworthy “Is Parliament Sovereign?”]. 
38 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1651), quoting Job 41. 
39 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1651). 
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of the sovereign is the sum of justice – that is the content of the law and the content of 
justice are one and the same.40  
 
According to Goldsworthy however, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has 
stronger roots in Lockean political theory.41 For both Hobbes and Locke the existence of 
a sovereign state was a necessary precursor to a law and liberty and a stable and orderly 
civil society. However Locke believed that the legislature required the consent of the 
population to rule, as opposed to Hobbes’ theory, which deemed the people or ‘subjects’ 
as consenting to the imposition of the states sovereign power.42 This authorisation did not 
import any rights of the subjects against the sovereign power.43 The powers of Parliament 
derived their unreviewability and indivisibility because the state was there with the 
consent of the governed.44 It then followed that there was no sense in placing limits on its 
powers. 45  Although Locke argued that there were limits to what parliament could 
legitimately do, these limits were moral, not legal and could only be enforced by a 
popular rebellion dissolving the constitution. 46  In essence, even following Locke, 
parliament’s sovereign power is legally unlimited.  
 
Goldsworthy argues that the consensus on Parliament’s legally absolute powers 
throughout the 18th century rested on the Lockean thesis – that the law should not 
recognise any limits to its own authority (though there was acceptance of the Whig theory 
that popular rebellion could be justified on moral grounds). 47  Such an argument is 
supported by the fact the British Crown, through the Treaty, sought the consent of the 
Maori to its government. Whether the Crown believed it needed Maori consent or had 
simply learnt from past mistakes in colonising other lands is another question. What is 
clear, following the Maori text of the Treaty, is that Maori did not consent to the Crown 
having absolute sovereignty over their land and people.  
C The Drift of Parliamentary Sovereignty onto New Zealand shores  
If parliamentary sovereignty begins with the consent of the population, what then is the 
basis for the application of this doctrine in New Zealand? With the assumption of legal 
sovereignty by the British Crown being questioned, New Zealand’s governing structures, 
                                                 
40 Andrew Sharp Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand 
since the 1970s (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) at 250 [Andrew Sharp Justice and the Maori]. 
41 Jeffrey Goldsworthy “Is Parliament Sovereign?”, above n 37 at 11. 
42 At 11-12 and Andrew Sharp Justice and the Maori, above n 40 at 250. 
43 Andrew Sharp Justice and the Maori, above n 40 at 250. 
44 Jeffrey Goldsworthy “Is Parliament Sovereign?” above n 37 at 11-12. 
45 At 11-12. 
46 At 11-12. 
47 At 11-12. 
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like those in other colonial nations, are facing a crisis of legitimacy.48 The following 
sections will examine the basis for the assumption of sovereignty over New Zealand by 
the British Crown. It is noted that the Treaty was an agreement with the British Crown as 
an imperial constitutional entity. At that stage there was no Crown in right of New 
Zealand to which the imperial Crown’s obligations under the Treaty could have passed. 
Thus for the sake of clarity the transfer of absolute sovereign power from the British 
Crown to the Parliament in New Zealand as a separate constitutional entity will also be 
detailed.  
1 Crown acquisition of sovereignty  
The acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown is usually seen as being based on two 
acts of state: the English text of the Treaty and the proclamations of sovereignty over the 
North and South Islands of New Zealand by the Crown.49  Any analysis that simply 
ignores the differences between the two Treaty translations and states that article one of 
the English text as the basis for the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty stands on shaky 
ground. In fact, many believe that it is “philosophically, legally and culturally” 
impossible for a Maori chief to cede their mana.50 As aptly put by Jock Brookfield in 
1993:51 
 
…it is impossible to believe that any of them consented to the claims of absolute and 
unlimited power, even over the Treaty itself, which under the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, were made by Queen Victoria’s Parliament and made by 
the New Zealand Parliament as successor. 
 
On this view, at the very least the Treaty must be considered a limit on parliament 
sovereignty, rather than assent to it.  As observed by Joe Williams, the signatories did not 
sign the Proclamation of Waitangi but the Treaty of Waitangi:52  
 
It was not a document by which English law was imposed on the Maori. It was a 
document which signaled the acceptance of English law subject to certain clear and 
                                                 
48  Noel Cox “Proposed Constitutional Reform in New Zealand: Constitutional Entrenchment, Written 
Constitutions and Legitimacy” (2013) 102 Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 51 at 54. 
49 At 54. 
50 Dr Susan Healy “Contribution to Constitutional Review Panel” at 4. See also Susan Healy and others 
(eds) Ngapuhi Speaks: He Wakaputanga and Te Tiriti O Waitangi - Independent Report on Ngapuhi Nui 
Tonu Claim (Network Waitangi Whangarei, 2012). 
51 FM Brookfield “Parliament, the Treaty and Freedom: Millennial Hopes and Speculations” (Valedictory 
Lecture, University of Auckland, 1993).  
52 Joe Williams “Not Ceded but Redistributed”, above n 5 at 192-193. 
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specific terms and conditions. Foremost among theses was of course the guarantee of 
rangatiratanga. 
 
The Treaty texts are thus unable to shed light on the basis for the imposition of absolute 
Crown sovereignty. The second basis for the acquisition of sovereignty over New 
Zealand by the British Crown is the two proclamations of sovereignty by Governor 
Hobson on 21 May 1840.  The first proclamation declared sovereignty over the North 
Island by way of cession.53 The sole foundation for this proclamation was the cession of 
sovereignty provided for in article one of the Treaty.54  However, the Treaty signing 
process did not finish until October 1840, six months after the Hobson’s proclamation.55 
The second proclamation was issued over the South and Stewart Islands, citing discovery 
as the ground for the acquisition.56 The imposition of British sovereignty was officially 
published in the London Gazette in October 1840.57 
 
In the landmark decision New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 
(henceforth referred to as the SOE case, 58  the Court of Appeal accepted Hobson’s 
proclamations and the subsequent gazetting of the acquisition as authoritatively 
establishing Crown sovereignty over New Zealand. 59  Somers J considered the 
proclamations and New Zealand’s subsequent legislative history put the issue of Crown 
acquisition of sovereignty beyond dispute.60 Sovereignty in New Zealand undoubtedly 
resided in Parliament.61  
 
On that account, it appears that the acquisition of sovereignty over New Zealand by the 
British Crown is a case of “because I said so, so it is”. The Crown simply proclaimed 
sovereignty and so it was. What then of the requirement of consent of the population? 
                                                 
53 Orange The Treaty of Waitangi, above n 21 at 84. 
54 Matthew SR Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 2008) at 55-56 [Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and 
Constitution]. 
55 Orange The Treaty of Waitangi, above n 21 at 85. 
56 Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution, above n 54 at 55-56. 
57 At 56. 
58 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) [SOE case]. The case is 
commonly referred to as the Lands case, but as the Supreme Court noted in the recent case of New Zealand 
Maori Council v Attorney-General [2013] NZSC 6 at fn 25 the case concerned both land and water rights. 
This paper will therefore refer to it as the SOE case. 
59 At 671 per Richardson J. 
60 At 690. 
61 At 690. 
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Maori who signed the Te Tiriti cannot be said to have acceded to the Crown’s acquisition 
of sovereignty, let alone the many Maori who did not sign either translation. Nor could 
those 39 who signed the English translation be fairly said to have ceded sovereignty, 
given that only the Maori translation was read at Waitangi. 
 
A significant discrepancy therefore existed between the sovereignty the British Crown 
claimed over the whole of New Zealand, and what it could legitimately claim under the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 62  To get around this discrepancy Brookfield argues that the 
sovereignty of the British Crown did not derive from the Treaty but was instead acquired 
over time through the revolutionary overthrow of the existing political order.63 According 
to Brookfield the revolution began in 1840 with the seizure of power by the British 
Crown through the Treaty and subsequent proclamations.64 Because a revolution is by 
definition illegal, its validity rests on its success, rather than whether the means by which 
it was achieved were legal or moral.65 Though a revolution may have been instigated in 
1840, it was far from completed as Maori customary law continued to exist in pockets 
around the country.66 Indeed the Court of Appeal commented in 1902 that “the Queen’s 
writ did not run throughout all districts of NZ till long after 1865”.67 It was not until the 
end of the 19th century that the British Crown’s seizure of power became complete 
through the employment of warfare or exertion of other pressures.68 
 
However, for a significant chunk of the 19th century, another theory of the Crown’s 
acquisition of sovereignty over New Zealand held sway and was adopted by lawyers and 
historians in the generations that followed. The infamous dictum of Chief Justice 
Prendergast in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington 69  essentially held that the Crown 
acquired sovereignty over New Zealand through discovery. The Chief Justice denied 
original Maori sovereignty over New Zealand, despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary.70 The Treaty was ruled a “simple nullity” as “no body politic existed capable of 
                                                 
62  FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (Updated ed, 
Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2006) at 109 [FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights]. 
63 At chpt 6. 
64 At 109 and 126. 
65 At 109. 
66 At 109 and 114-5. 
67 Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington (1902) 21 NZLR 655 at 666. 
68 At 109. 
69 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) 72 (SC) [Wi Parata]. 
70 See He Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (A Declaration of the Independence of New 
Zealand) 1835 discussed on page 7. 
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making a cession of sovereignty”.71 The Chief Justice refused to enforce terms of cession 
of a block of land at Whitireia by its Maori owners as relations between the Crown and 
Maori were “acts of state” and were therefore not reviewable by any court.72 Though the 
Privy Council overturned much of the precedent in the Wi Parata case in 1901 in Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker,73 Chief Justice Prendergast’s ruling is illustrative of the pervasiveness of 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
The denial of original Maori sovereignty and supposition of original Crown sovereignty 
can be seen as an attempt by the Chief Justice to provide it with historical legitimacy.74 If 
the validity of Crown sovereignty over New Zealand was conditional on Maori 
permission, the basis of constitutional sovereignty was not the Crown but the consent of 
Maori under the Treaty.75 Denying original Maori sovereignty rendered the sovereignty 
of the Crown “absolute and unqualifiable by Maori political forms or claims” thus 
bringing it in line with Diceyan orthodoxy.76 However, McHugh argues, at the time of the 
judgment the sovereignty of the Crown was more de facto, than de jure as held by the 
Chief Justice.77 The royal writ had not yet extended to some tribes in the Kingitanga and 
Tuhoe tribes in the central North Island.78 In fact during that period the King Country was 
“an independent Maori state nearly two-thirds the size of Belgium”.79 Thus in reality the 
Crown’s sovereignty was much “less secure” than de jure.80  This is consistent with 
Brookfield’s line of reasoning – the Crown’s revolutionary seizure of sovereignty began 
in 1840, but was far from complete in that significant sections of the Maori population 
continued to live in accordance with Maori customary law. Nevertheless, a divided 
sovereignty approach would have been a more accurate record of Crown-Maori relations 
in the 1870’s, McHugh argues such a line of thinking was obscured by the “overriding 
concern with the singularity and absolute character of Crown sovereignty”.81  
                                                 
71 Wi Parata, above n 25 at 78. 
72 At 79. 
73 (1900-01) [1840-1932] NZPCC 371. 
74 PG McHugh “Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown Sovereignty in New Zealand”, above n 33.   
75 Justice E. W. Thomas “The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative Thought or Two for 
the New Millennium” (2000) 31 VUWLR 5 at 35; PG McHugh “Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown 
Sovereignty in New Zealand”, above n 33 at 80 and 97. 
76 PG McHugh “Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown Sovereignty in New Zealand”, above n 33 at 80. 
77 At 78. 
78 At 78.  
79 J Belich The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland University 
Press, Auckland, 1986) at 306. 
80 PG McHugh “Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown Sovereignty in New Zealand”, above n 33 at 78. 
81 At 79. 
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2 Development of Crown-in-right of New Zealand 
As noted earlier, the Maori signed the Treaty with the British Crown as an imperial 
constitutional entity. By constitutional convention, the British Crown’s obligations under 
the Treaty passed to the local New Zealand Government.82 These obligations were later 
transferred in law to the Crown in right of New Zealand as a separate constitutional entity 
(Parliament). The New Zealand Parliament not only inherited obligations under the 
Treaty, but also the Diceyan conception of parliamentary sovereignty that had taken root 
in the United Kingdom. Brookfield views this transfer of sovereignty as revolutionary in 
that it was not provided for by legislation.83  
 
In 1852, the British Parliament passed the New Zealand Constitution Act, providing for a 
General Assembly in New Zealand consisting of a Governor, a House of Representatives 
and Legislative Council. Responsible government initially had several restrictions on it. 
Under section 53 the legislature could only make laws for the “peace, order and good 
government of New Zealand” so long as they were not “repugnant” to British law.84 The 
British Crown retained control of land sales and external affairs, and still held the right to 
disallow legislation under section 58.85 Further, the legislature did not have the power to 
amend the 1852 Act itself. An amendment to the Act in 1857 granted the General 
Assembly the power to amend and repeal provisions of the 1852 Act, except those 
dealing with the establishment and powers of the Assembly itself.86  Further amendment 
in 1865 confirmed the power of the New Zealand Parliament to make its own laws, but 
only so far as they were consistent with British law – thus it was not yet a separate 
constitutional entity to which the British Crown’s Treaty obligations could be transferred. 
 
New Zealand Parliament did not become “sovereign” in its own right until it passed the 
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act in 1947, giving it the capacity to “make or unmake 
any law”, including its constitution, regardless of whether or not it was consistent with 
British law. 87  Brookfield sees this statute as securing the transmission of legal 
sovereignty, or title to rule, to the New Zealand Parliament as a separate constitutional 
entity.88  The Constitution Act 1986 simply confirmed the revolutionary break that had 
already taken place, acknowledging the existence of a separate Crown-in-right of New 
                                                 
82 FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights, above n 62 at 120. 
83 At 126. 
84 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK). 
85 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK). 
86 New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1857 (UK). 
87 Parliamentary Research Paper “New Zealand Sovereignty: 1857, 1907, 1947 or 1987?” (August 2007) at 
7. 
88 FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights, above n 62 at 122. 
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Zealand.89 
 
The Privy Council appears to take a similar view in New Zealand Maori Council v 
Attorney-General, commenting that “the obligations of Her Majesty the Queen of 
England under the Treaty are now those of the Crown in right of NZ” and as a result 
could no longer bind the British Crown.90 The essence of Brookfield’s argument is then 
that, although its origins were usurpatory, the passage of time rendered the sovereignty of 
the British Crown in New Zealand, and later the absolute Diceyan sovereignty of the New 
Zealand Parliament, legally valid. 91  In other words, though historically illegitimate, 
Parliamentary sovereignty has become a legal fact. 
 
The original basis for the imposition British sovereignty in New Zealand does not rely on 
the consent of the governed. The historical and contextual background of the Treaty 
clearly shows that Rangatira did not consent to the sovereignty of the British Crown. 
Rather Rangatira that signed the Treaty saw it as a way to protect their tribal prerogative 
to govern themselves.92 Perhaps then it is more fitting to talk of the sovereignty of the 
British Crown over New Zealand being imposed rather than acquired. Moreover, the 
sovereignty that was imposed was the unabridged Diceyan conception of sovereignty: 
absolute, indivisible and unreviewable.  
 
III Tension between Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Treaty 
So, where does the Treaty sit in relation to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
holding, as it does, that parliament’s power is absolute and indivisible? Can the two co-
exist? As will be discussed in the following sections, the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the Treaty do co-exist to a certain, albeit limited, degree. For example, 
certain legislation requires that the “principles” of the Treaty must be taken into account 
in decision-making. The problem is that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty allows 
Parliament to assert sovereignty over the Treaty itself, thus the Treaty can only have 
effect to the extent that Parliament says it can. So far in New Zealand’s constitutional 
history the only place reserved for the Treaty has been within the vast bounds of the 
sovereign’s power, as illustrated by both statute and common law. The Diceyan 
conception of parliamentary sovereignty leaves no room for the guarantees of Maori 
chieftainship over their lands, settlements and personal property contained in Te Tiriti to 
be fulfilled. The Treaty/ Te Tiriti is essentially at the mercy of Parliament, in which 
Maori are a minority. In the sections that follow, the current approach of reading the 
Treaty into the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty will be discussed, drawing on 
                                                 
89 FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights, above n 62 at 123. 
90 Broadcasting Assets case, above n 3 at 517. 
91 Andrew Sharp Justice and the Maori, above n 40 at 272. 
92 Joe Williams “Not Ceded but Redistributed”, above n 5 at 191. 
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examples from legislation and common law. It is concluded that the current approach is 
inadequate to give any real effect to the distribution of powers provided for in Te Tiriti 
and therefore we need to look to options for constitutional reform. 
 
A   The Treaty and Parliament: Legislative Recognition 
1 Early Recognition? Section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK) 
Section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK) provided for the creation of 
self-governing Maori districts in which Maori “laws, customs and usages” could continue 
to be observed in so far as they were not “repugnant to the general principles of 
humanity”. Section 71 was one of the provisions that could not be repealed or amended 
by the General Assembly until 1947 and remained in force until its repeal through the 
introduction of the Constitution Act 1986 (NZ). 93 Though the section does not explicitly 
refer to the Treaty, the view could be taken that it gives limited effect to the guarantee of 
tino rangatiratanga found in article two of Te Tiriti. However, the power was only 
exercisable by the sovereign on the advice of the Governor, leaving Maori at the mercy of 
the Parliament.94  Section 71 was never actually implemented and Maori attempts to 
realise this autonomy, such as the Kingitanga and the Kotahitanga movements, were not 
recognised by the government. As a result these movements retained only a de facto 
status. The section possibly came close to use on two occasions when Governor Grey 
offered to recognise King Tawhaio’s authority over what was known as King Country.95 
Whether or not section 71 would have been implemented is speculative as King Tawhaio 
refused to accept these offers unless confiscated land was returned.  
 
It could be argued that section 71 permitted the continuation of areas of Maori autonomy, 
however such a view is hard to reconcile with the wording of the provision, which 
required the issuing of a Letters Patent by the Queen. In reality, section 71 simply 
reinforced the sovereignty of Parliament and as a corollary disempowered Maori. Maori 
systems of Tikanga and custom could not exist alongside the Westminster system – they 
could only exist under it to the extent that Parliament allowed for through the enactment 
of legislation. Maori systems of Tikanga in so far as they existed outside of that 
framework remained de facto and received no legal recognition. 
                                                 
93 Section 28 of the Constitution Act 1986 repealed the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852. 
94 New Zealand Constitutional Act 1852, s 71. 
95 FM Brookfield Waitangi and Indigenous Rights, above n 62 at 118. 
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2 Incorporation into domestic legislation 
Although the Treaty of Waitangi is arguably a valid international treaty,96 the dualist 
nature of New Zealand’s constitution means that it cannot impose domestic legal 
obligations unless Parliament, in its sovereign capacity, incorporates it into domestic 
legislation.97 This is the orthodox position that was set out by the Privy Council in Hoani 
Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board.98 The Treaty was incorporated 
into domestic law with the enactment of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975, giving it 
legal status but not full legal force. 99  The Treaty of Waitangi Act provided for the 
establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal “to make recommendations on claims relating to 
the practical application of the Treaty and to determine whether certain matters are 
inconsistent with the Treaty”.100 
 
Around 30 Acts now require decision-makers to “give effect to”, 101  “take into 
account”,102 “give particular recognition to”,103 or “have regard to”, the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi when exercising public powers. Other Acts contain specific 
provisions recognising the rights of Maori in certain areas such as participatory rights or 
rights to be consulted.104 Further, since July 2013 a statement disclosing the steps taken to 
ensure consistency with the Treaty principles must accompany proposed legislation.105 
 
The incorporation of the Treaty into domestic legislation in the form of principles can be 
viewed as a limit on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Many submissions to the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel considered the current limits on Parliament’s powers 
through the incorporation of the Treaty principles into legislation to be sufficient for the 
                                                 
96 See discussion about the status of the Treaty of Waitangi in international law, in particular whether it 
should be regarded as a treaty of cession or a treaty of protection in Matthew Palmer The Treaty of 
Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution, above n 54 at 154-167. The author concludes that on 
either analysis the Treaty of Waitangi is a valid international treaty. For a contrary view see also Anthony P 
Molloy “The Non-Treaty of Waitangi” (1971) NZLJ 193.  
97 Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution, above n 54 at 168. 
98 Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] AC 308. 
99 Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution, above n 54 at 180. 
100 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, long title. Note: The jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal was extended in 
1985 to include investigation of historical grievances from the period of 1840-1975.  
101 E.g. Conservation Act 1987, s 4. 
102 E.g. Resource Management Act 1991, s 8; Conservation Act 2000, s 6. 
103 Royal New Zealand Foundation for the Blind Act 1992, s 10. 
104 Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution, above n 54 at 183. 
105 The Treasury “Disclosure Statements for Government Legislation: A Technical Guide for Departments” 
(June 2013) at 37. 
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protection and enforcement of the Treaty.106 Following this line of thinking, significant 
constitutional reform is unnecessary as Treaty rights and obligations can be 
accommodated through the development of existing constitutional arrangements. 107 
However, accommodating the Treaty within existing constitutional arrangements is not 
equal to giving effect to the Treaty. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty causes 
current constitutional structures to fail to give effect to the Treaty for three reasons that 
will be addressed in turn.  
 
Firstly, the incorporation of Treaty ‘principles’ as opposed to the Treaty text in legislation 
does not impose any real limit to Parliamentary sovereignty. One reason for legislation 
incorporating Treaty principles as opposed to the Treaty text itself is no doubt the 
differences between the Maori and English translations of the Treaty. However, as argued 
earlier, the Maori text of the Treaty, in which the Maori ceded not sovereignty but 
governorship, should be given precedence. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
constitutes another likely reason for the incorporation of “principles” as opposed to the 
text of the Treaty itself. Parliament’s sovereignty is indivisible. To give legal effect to the 
Maori text of the Treaty would be doctrinally impossible, as it would potentially result in 
the acknowledgement of two “sovereign” bodies. The principles of the Treaty therefore 
constitute a lesser alternative to full incorporation of the Treaty and as such do not pose a 
threat to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
Secondly, any recognition of the Treaty relies on Parliament incorporating the Treaty 
principles into legislation. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty therefore 
disempowers Maori by removing any means of self-determination.  
  
Finally, in so far as legislation can be argued to place a limit on Parliament’s sovereignty, 
any limit is moral rather than legal. Perhaps the clearest example of the unbridled power 
of Parliament is the foreshore and seabed debacle that culminated in the enactment of the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. The saga began in June 2003 when the Court of Appeal 
released its judgment on the case of Attorney-General v Ngati Apa.108 The case concerned 
the common law doctrine of Native title, which holds that the property rights of 
indigenous populations continue after the acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown until 
they are legally extinguished.109  The litigation leading to the decision began in 1997 
when eight iwi of the northern South Island made an application to the Maori Land Court 
                                                 
106 Constitutional Advisory Panel “New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on a Conversation” (Ministry of 
Justice, November 2013) at 34 [Constitutional Advisory Panel Report]. 
107 At 34. 
108 Attorney General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 [Foreshore and Seabed case]. 
109 Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Seabed Policy (WAI 1071, 2004) at 127-128. 
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requesting that "the foreshore and seabed of the Marlborough Sounds, extending to the 
limits of New Zealand's territorial sea" be defined as Māori customary land under the Te 
Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993. 110  The High Court overruled the Maori Land Court 
finding that it had jurisdiction to consider the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held 
that the Crown had never extinguished Maori customary title over the foreshore and 
seabed, and that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction to investigate the title to the land 
and determine the relevant interests of owners.111  
 
The Government swiftly issued a discussion paper announcing its plan to vest title to the 
foreshore and seabed in the public in order to ensure that public rights of access were not 
compromised. The proposed policy planned to remove the jurisdiction of the Maori Land 
Court under the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 to consider whether the foreshore and 
seabed is Maori customary land. 112  The High Court’s jurisdiction to hear claims in 
relation to the foreshore and seabed based on the common law doctrine of customary 
rights would also be removed. 113  The Waitangi Tribunal swiftly released a report, 
concluding that the Crown’s policy was unjustifiably in breach of the Treaty principles.114 
Specifically, the policy breached the guarantees made to Maori in article two in that it 
failed to protect Maori tino rangatiratanga, and also failed to honour the rule of law 
protection of the equal rights of all citizens at law contained in article 3.115  
 
Despite the Waitangi Tribunal report, and knowledge that the proposed legislation was in 
breach of the plain text of the Treaty and the rule of law, Parliament in its sovereign 
capacity enacted the Foreshore and Seabed Act on November 18 2004. The Foreshore 
and Seabed Act had the effect of extinguishing any Maori customary title over the 
foreshore and seabed by vesting “full legal and beneficial ownership of the foreshore and 
seabed” in the Crown.116 As proposed, the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court and the 
High Court was also removed without providing for any form of redress.117 Thus, the 
foreshore and seabed debate and subsequent legislation is a prime illustration of the 
Diceyan conception of parliamentary sovereignty in action. Parliamentary sovereignty 
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poses a barrier to any form of meaningful treaty partnership because ultimately 
parliament can do as it pleases. Parliament decided what it believed to be the best course 
of action to protect the interests of the majority and then acted on it despite vociferous 
opposition from Maori.  
 
The legal reality is that the Treaty does not limit Parliament’s powers. As evidenced by 
the Foreshore and Seabed Act, Parliament is free to ignore moral constraints and 
legislation that is morally dubious is essentially legitimised. It could be argued that moral 
constraints are adequate. Indeed political, 118  and international 119  pressures led to the 
repeal of the Foreshore and Seabed Act in 2011, through the enactment of the Marine and 
Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act. 120 . Although a marked improvement to its 
predecessor, it is likely that what the Act offers Maori is less appealing than what would 
have resulted through negotiations with the Crown.121 Although we can only speculate, 
had New Zealand had a Constitution that placed the Treaty as opposed to the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty at its core it is likely the whole saga would have been 
prevented.  
 
The Foreshore and Seabed debate highlights the need for change in New Zealand’s 
constitutional structures in order to make way for a true Treaty partnership in which the 
Maori and the Crown work together.  
3 International law and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
For the sake of completeness it should be noted that some commentators have argued that 
the significance of parliamentary sovereignty is diminishing. There are a number of 
causal factors for its decline in popularity in the global context. Colonial nations in 
particular are struggling to instill a sense of historical legitimacy into the acquisition of 
sovereignty. Further, with most countries having controlled constitutions the sovereignty 
                                                 
118 The National Party formed a minority government based on a Confidence and Supply Agreement with 
the Maori Party, which was established following the foreshore and seabed debacle in 2004. One of the key 
tenets of Maori Party policy was that the Foreshore and Seabed Act would be revisited. A Ministerial 
Review Panel was established in 2009 to review the Act. 
119 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD} released a decision on the Act 
stating it “appears to… contain discriminatory aspects against the Maori…” See CERD “Decision on 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004” (11 March 2005) Decision 1 (66): New Zealand CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1 at 
[6]. In August 2007 CERD reiterated its recommendation that renewed conversation between the Crown 
and Maori in order to find ways to mitigate the Act’s discriminatory effects. 
120 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, s 5. 
121 RP Boast “Foreshore and Seabed, Again” (2011) 9 NZJPIL 271 at 282. 
23  
 
of parliament is no longer indivisible or unreviewable. 122  However, the process of 
globalisation has had perhaps the biggest impact on the pervasiveness of the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. As highlighted by Sir Kenneth Keith:123 
 
In the present world, made even smaller by technology and many other human and 
natural forces, no state is fully sovereign in its external relations… no politician or 
government has real internal sovereignty. What we are seeing is the dispersal of 
power from so called sovereign states in at least three directions – to the 
international community, to the private sector, and to public bodies and communities 
within the state. 
 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is 
relevant in regards to the dispersal of sovereignty in the international community. 
UNDRIP recognises the rights of tribal and indigenous peoples’ to determine their own 
future and identity and the “urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous 
peoples affirmed in treaties”.124 New Zealand, together with Canada, Australia and the 
United States refused to endorse the declaration when it was first published in 2007. 
UNDRIP was finally endorsed by New Zealand in April 2010. However, Prime Minister 
John Key emphasised that the declaration is an ‘aspirational’ document and will only be 
implemented “within the current constitutional frameworks of New Zealand.” 125 
Although the endorsement is a step in the right direction, it is not legally binding until 
UNDRIP is ratified and incorporated into domestic legislation. Thus the declaration can 
only constitute a limit on Parliament’s sovereignty if Parliament decides to incorporate it 
into legislation. Even then, it is questionable how effective international law will be 
limiting parliament’s sovereignty.  
 
Nevertheless, the changing global backdrop suggests that the applicability of the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty should no longer be taken as a given. The time is ripe for 
review. The current constitutional conversation provides New Zealanders with an 
opportunity to question the basis for the continuing application of the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty their constitution. 
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B   The Treaty and Parliamentary Sovereignty in the Courts 
Chief Justice Prendergast’s denial of original Maori sovereignty in the Wi Parata case 
has since been rejected as incorrect and replaced by the conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty as limited by the Treaty. The case law concerning the Treaty builds upon the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as the courts role in relation to the Treaty is largely 
dependent on legislation. It must be acknowledged that the Court’s have played a pivotal 
part in holding the Executive accountable to its Treaty obligations.  However, the 
following case law illustrates that progress for Maori through the Court is severely 
restricted by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as the Treaty can only be enforced 
to the extent that Parliament has provided for in legislation. The majority of major case 
law surrounding the Treaty has involved statutes that make explicit reference to the 
Treaty principles.  
 
The large amount of litigation arising out of the transfer of Crown assets to state owned 
enterprises in the late 1980s and early 1990s is illustrative of the limitation that the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty places on the courts.126 In landmark decision of the 
Court of Appeal in SOE case the panel of five judges, each delivering a separate 
judgment, unanimously concluded that “the Treaty created an enduring relationship of a 
fiduciary nature akin to a partnership” between the Crown and Maori.127 As such, the 
relationship placed a positive duty on each party to act in good faith, reasonably and 
honourably towards each other.128  The case concerned section 9 of the State Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986, which provides that “nothing in [the] Act shall permit the Crown to 
act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi”.129 The 
Court of Appeal granted declaratory relief, holding that the proposed transfer of Crown 
assets to state owned enterprises from which reparation for Treaty breaches could 
foreseeably be drawn on the recommendation of the Waitangi Tribunal was inconsistent 
with Treaty principles.130 The Crown was required to put in place safeguards that gave 
reasonable assurance that lands or waters would not be transferred in a way that could 
prejudice Maori claims before any assets could be transferred. The parties eventually 
reached an agreement outside of Court and the declarations were discharged. The Treaty 
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of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 incorporated into legislation the scheme for 
safeguarding Maori claims to land vested in the Crown. 
 
Although the SOE case can be counted as a success for the Maori claimants, it must be 
remembered that the Court was only able to grant relief because Parliament had 
incorporated the Treaty principles into legislation. Near the end of his judgment, 
President Cooke stated:131  
 
[B]ut let what opened the way enabling the Court to reach this decision not be 
overlooked. Two crucial steps were taken by Parliament in enacting the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act and in insisting on the principles of the Treaty in the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act. If the judiciary has been able to play a role to some extent creative, 
that is because the legislature has given the opportunity.  
 
Without legislative license from Parliament the Court would be unable to give effect to 
the Treaty. Section 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act opened the door to further 
litigation in the years that followed. The case of New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-
General [1989]132 resulted from a change in Crown policy regarding the disposal of forest 
assets. The Court of Appeal affirmed the characterisation of Crown-Maori relationship as 
akin to a partnership expounded in the SOE case. Again in Tainui Maori Trust Board v 
Attorney-General [1989]133 and later in Attorney-General v New Zealand Maori Council 
[1991]134 , section 9 paved a way for the Court to hold the Executive to its Treaty 
obligations. Although positive, these common law developments do not come close to 
realising Maori aspirations for tino rangatiratanga. 
 
Section 9 came before the High Court135 and the Supreme Court more recently in New 
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [2013] (Water rights case).136 The Water 
Rights case concerned the reconstitution of the Crown’s ownership in the state-owned 
enterprise Mighty River Power Limited (MRP) as a mixed ownership model company 
under Part 5A of the Public Finance Act 1989. The reconfiguration of MRP as a mixed 
ownership model company allowed the Crown to sell up to 49 per cent of its shares in the 
company, which was required by legislation to be wholly owned by the Crown. 
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Parliament was to enact the Mixed Ownership Amendment Act to bring the proposal into 
effect, allowing 49 per cent of shares in MRP to be sold to the public. The claimants 
sought declarations in the High Court that removing MRP from the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act and the proposed sale of shares was unlawful in light of section 9 of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act and section 45Q of the Public Finance Act 1989. The 
claimant’s argued that the reconstitution of MRP was in breach of the principles of the 
Treaty because it would “materially impair the ability of the Crown to act on 
recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal” relating to Treaty breaches.137 
 
Justice Ronald Young held that because the proposed sale of shares was to be achieved 
through an Act of Parliament it was not reviewable for compliance with the Treaty 
principles.138 On appeal, the Supreme Court focused on the Crown’s proposal, rather than 
how it was going to be brought into effect. The Court held that the Crown’s proposal was 
reviewable as Parliament’s intention in enacting section 45Q was that the Crown was 
held under a continuing obligation to comply with Treaty principles when acting under 
the statutory provisions governing the mixed ownership companies regime.139 Section 
45Q is identical to section 9, with an additional subsection clarifying that the obligation 
to act consistently with the principles of the Treaty applies only to the Crown.140 The 
Court held that section 45Q carried with it the “heritage of section 9”, in particular the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in the SOE case, such being the intention of 
Parliament.141 
 
By framing their decision in terms of parliamentary intention, and somewhat artificially 
the review of Crown action rather than parliamentary action, the Supreme Court was able 
to avoid the roadblock of parliamentary sovereignty faced by Ronald Young J in the High 
Court. Though the claimant’s succeeded on this point, the appeal was dismissed because 
the Crown’s proposal was not found to be inconsistent with the Treaty principles. 
 
The common denominator in the cases arising from the transfer of Crown assets is that 
the basic arguments of the parties remained within the confines of section 9 of the State-
Owned Enterprises Act. 142  Wider questions about the status of the Treaty in New 
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Zealand’s constitutional structure were not raised.143 The Court reinforced the orthodox 
position – “neither the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi, nor its principles, are, as a 
matter of law, a restraint on the legislative supremacy of parliament”.144 In delivering the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Sealords case,145 President Cooke pointed out that 
any dicta bearing on wider constitutional questions surrounding the Treaty could be no 
more than obiter, and rightly so.146 Indeed, it is not for the unelected judiciary to rule on 
constitutional matters. In the rare instance that they do pass judgment on such matters, it 
is not binding on the sovereign Parliament. 
 
The Sealords case is another illustration of parliamentary sovereignty as a barrier to a 
Treaty-based Crown-Maori partnership. The Sealord’s case concerned Maori fishing 
claims and centered on a Deed of Settlement between the negotiators for various iwi, the 
New Zealand Maori Council and the National Maori Congress and the Minister and 
Justice and Minister of Fisheries, both representing the Crown. Decisions of the Courts in 
relation to Maori fishing rights prior to the Sealords case form part of the factual matrix 
and will be discussed briefly by way of background. The cases began with the 
introduction of the Quota Management System (QMS) by the government to regulate 
commercial fisheries in New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone. The QMS empowers 
the Minister of Fisheries to declare certain areas to be quota management areas and to 
deem certain species of fish in those areas to be subject to the QMS.147 A total allowable 
catch for the species in the quota management area is set before an allowance for Maori 
non-commercial fishing rights is subtracted, leaving the total allowable commercial 
catch.148  The total allowable commercial catch is divided into individual transferable 
quotas (ITQ’s), a form of property right to catch and sell a certain amount of fish.149 
Quota holders pay an annual rental fee to the Crown and can trade or lease their property 
rights.150  
 
                                                 
143 Sealords case, above n 1 at 304. 
144 SOE case, above n 58 at 642, per Somers J. 
145 Sealords case, above n 1. 
146 At 304. 
147 For an accessible description of the QMS see Justine Munro “The Treaty of Waitangi and the Sealord 
Deal” (1994) 24 VUWLR 389 at 400-402 [Munro “The Treaty of Waitangi and the Sealord Deal”]. 
148 At 400. 
149 Fisheries Act 1983, s 28O. 
150 Fisheries Act 1983, s 28ZC. 
28  
 
The QMS is based on the premise that the Crown, and not Maori, own all fisheries151 and 
therefore was in breach of article 2 of both the English and Maori texts of the Treaty – the 
right of Maori to full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their fisheries and tino 
rangatiratanga over their lands and taonga. The Crown proceeded with the 
implementation of the QMS despite warnings from the Waitangi Tribunal that its actions 
were in breach of the Treaty. Maori sought judicial review of the Minister of Fisheries’ 
decision to allocate quota under the QMS. The Maori claimants argued that the Minister’s 
decision was unlawful under section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983 which provided that 
“Nothing in this Act shall affect Maori fishing rights”. The High Court upheld the claim 
and issued an interim declaration that the allocations should not proceed.152 
 
The decision of the High Court had the effect of forcing the Crown into negotiations with 
Maori. However when no agreement was reached Parliament decided to legislate for 
settlement without Maori consent. The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 provided for the transfer 
of a 10 per cent quota within the QMS framework from the Crown to Maori over three 
years153 and granted $10 million towards the establishment of Maori Fisheries.154 The 
Court of Appeal held that the Act was sufficient, albeit as an interim measure,155 to meet 
any ongoing or future Treaty obligations in relation to fishing rights.156 The problem with 
the Act however was that it only reflected the Crown’s view on how to best recognise 
Maori fishing rights. 157  The negotiation process was essentially undermined by 
Parliament using what could be described as a right of veto and imposing a solution, 
which although a step in the right direction, failed to respect Maori autonomy. 
 
It was against this backdrop that the Sealord’s case came before the Court of Appeal. The 
opportunity of acquiring Sealords Limited (Sealords), a large company holding 26% of 
the total quota under the QMS as part of a joint venture between the Maori Fisheries 
Commission and Brierley Investments Limited came up in June 1992. Negotiations 
between representatives of various iwi and the Crown took place with a view to the 
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Crown helping Maori to purchase Sealord. The Deed of Settlement that gave rise to the 
litigation was executed on 23 September 1992. The Deed provided that the Crown would 
provide Maori with capital to enter into a joint venture with Brierley Investments Ltd to 
purchase Sealords.158 The Crown also agreed to introduce legislation to the amend the 
Fisheries Act authorising 20 per cent allocation of any new quota issued as a result of 
new species being added to the QMS. 159  In exchange the Maori involved in the 
negotiations agreed to withdraw all existing litigation,160 and support the repeal of all 
legislative references to Maori fishing rights and interests, including an amendment to the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 to remove claims related to commercial fishing from the 
Tribunals jurisdiction. 161  Maori negotiators only signed on behalf of those who had 
authorised them to do so, and the Deed did not purport to bind non-signatories. However, 
the Deed’s enacting legislation provided that the settlement extended to all Maori. 
 
Iwi and groups of Maori who opposed the Deed brought proceedings seeking interim 
relief by way of injunction or declaration. The applications were declined in both the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal refused to intervene, citing the 
longstanding rule of “non-interference by the courts in parliamentary proceedings”.162 
Parliament was free to make whatever legislative changes it saw fit.163 The Court was 
cautious to affirm the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, concluding, “[p]ublic policy 
requires that the representative chamber of Parliament should be free to determine what it 
will or will not allow to be put before it”.164 Because the Deed was not binding on non-
signatories the cause of action was “misconceived” and could not succeed.165  
 
However, there were hints of judicial creativity in the Sealords case. Of particular interest 
is President Cooke’s support for the characterisation of the Crown-Maori relationship as 
fiduciary one. In the absence of legislative licence, such as that in section 9 of the State-
Owned Enterprises Act, it is possible that the judiciary could find a fiduciary duty owed 
by the Crown to Maori arising from the Treaty. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v 
Sparrow held that unextinguished aboriginal title gave rise to a fiduciary obligation and 
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constructive trust on the part of the Crown.166  President Cooke stated that the “Treaty of 
Waitangi is a major support for such a duty”.167 Nevertheless, any decision of the Court is 
potentially subject to the overriding sovereignty of Parliament. Further, although the 
enforcement of fiduciary obligations may offer Maori more protection from the excesses 
of government, it would not actually give effect to the power sharing arrangement 
provide for in te Tiriti. 
 
The High Court case of Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority 
unfortunately faced the same fate.168 The legislation involved in the case did not contain a 
specific reference to the Treaty. Despite the absence of statutory licence, Justice Chilwell 
held that the Treaty principles, as part of the “fabric of New Zealand society”, should 
colour the interpretation of the legislation. 169  Though a presumption in statutory 
interpretation of consistency with the Treaty principles is a promising step towards 
greater protection of the Treaty, it stops well short of giving effect to the Treaty at law. 
 
The bottom line is judicial activism or creativity in the area of Treaty rights cannot 
prevent Parliament from doing as it pleases. The courts powers are limited by the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty – they may only act to the extent that Parliament provides 
for in legislation. The ability of Parliament to override any decision of the Court with 
legislation threatens to undermine any gains made from judicial creativity in 
interpretation. Decisions that served to enhance Maori rights under the Treaty also made 
them a function of parliamentary sovereignty. 170  Although the Treaty is often 
characterised as a limit on parliamentary sovereignty, in reality the sovereignty of 
Parliament is preserved.171  
 
IV Parliamentary sovereignty as an opportunity? 
There is a line of argument that holds parliamentary sovereignty out as an opportunity for 
the enforcement of the Treaty. For example, if New Zealand had adopted a supreme 
Constitution in 1852 or 1947 it is unlikely that the Treaty would have formed a part of it. 
Therefore Parliament, being bound by the Constitution, would not be able to give effect 
to the Treaty. The fact that Parliament has been unable to bind itself in the past means 
that today it has an opportunity to recognise and incorporate the Treaty. However, this 
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argument is somewhat circular, as it also follows that Parliament is free to completely 
ignore the Treaty. Further, the absolute and indivisible nature of parliamentary 
sovereignty means that there is only room for the recognition of the Treaty within the 
doctrine. As discussed, reading the Treaty into the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
ultimately preserves and bolsters, rather than limits, the absolute power of parliament.  
 
V Beyond “Sovereignty” 
To give a Crown-Maori partnership the best chance at success we need to move past the 
colonial preoccupation with indivisible and absolute “sovereignty” and look at options for 
constitutional reform that allow for power sharing. Maori aspirations for their 
advancement and development as a people are often framed in terms of “Maori 
sovereignty”. However, Mason Durie argues that framing Maori aspirations in terms of 
sovereignty threatens to undermine Maori society as inherent in the concept of 
sovereignty are colonial systems and processes that conflict with the Maori way.172 
“Sovereignty” is a colonial term, foreign to Maori concepts of power and governance.173 
The absolute vesting of power in one body or person to which everyone else is subject is 
contrary to Maori decision-making, which aims for “consensus rather than decree”.174 
The growth and advancement of Maori as a people is not going to be attained through 
simply replicating colonial systems of government.175 This concern was echoed by the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel in noting that more consideration should to be given to 
options for Treaty-based constitutional reform that do not seek to fit the Treaty within the 
current Westminster system.176 
 
Te Tiriti did not provide for a Maori Leviathan, nor did it provide for a Pakeha Leviathan. 
Te Tiriti provides no basis for either party to assert absolute sovereignty over the other. 
Te Tiriti provided for a redistribution of power between two equal peoples. It is therefore 
time to look beyond the pervasive notion of sovereignty and look to unique constitutional 
arrangements based on the Treaty. 
 
VI Options for Reform 
The discussion so far has set out the constitutional history of the Treaty and the somewhat 
shaky foundation for the application of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in New 
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Zealand. The analysis of the Treaty in legislation and in the courts shows some progress 
in terms of recognition of the Treaty. It also highlights that progress often relies on the 
good faith of Parliament in the exercise of its sovereign powers. In some instances 
parliamentary sovereignty has undermined the Treaty and as a result has worked 
injustice. In the words of Martin Luther King - “[l]aw and order exist for the purpose of 
establishing justice and when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously 
structured dams that block the flow of social progress”.177 It is argued that although the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty can be, and has been, used for just purposes, it has 
failed to deliver justice to Maori on many occasions. As such, parliamentary sovereignty 
constitutes a barrier to an effective Treaty-based partnership between the Crown and 
Maori. The Treaty provides a basis for moving forward as a nation, and a pattern for an 
effective Crown-Maori partnership that enables both parties to develop and prosper. To 
realise this potential, we need to rethink the position of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty as the underlying principle of our constitution.  
 
The following sections will discuss three models for reform and consider the strengths 
and weaknesses of each model. As a healthy Crown-Maori relationship is an essential 
element in any constitutional change, the fundamental principles underlying a successful 
Crown-Maori partnership will be outlined before addressing the models for reform.  
A   Key elements for an effective Treaty-partnership 
The Treaty of Waitangi/ Te Tiriti o Waitangi forms the foundation for the Crown-Maori 
partnership.178  It is a “blueprint”,179  or a “text for the performance of nation”.180  As 
summarised by Bronwyn Campbell:181  
 
There is glorious potential within Te Tiriti/ the Treaty to negotiate a better 
relationship between Maori and Pakeha (and others) that is able to transcend our 
colonising past, appreciate contemporary challenges of power, authority and 
position, and to explore new relationships in a way more akin to collaborative 
synergy. 
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The principles of good faith, reciprocity, equality and active protection are key elements 
to an effective Crown-Maori partnership. These principles can be drawn from the Treaty 
itself. As enunciated by the Court of Appeal in the SOE case, the Treaty “signified a 
partnership between Pakeha and Maori requiring each partner to act towards the other 
reasonably and with the utmost good faith”. 182  The principle of reciprocity can be 
distilled from the Treaty text – Maori kawanatanga or governorship (Article 1) and the 
right of preemption (Article 2) was given subject to the protection and guarantee of tribal 
authority and control over their resources.183 The preamble to Te Tiriti also imports a 
duty on behalf of the Crown to actively protect Maori people in the use of their lands and 
waters “to the fullest extent practicable”.184 The duty of active protection imposes on the 
Crown an obligation to ensure that Maori have resources capable of providing “comfort, 
safety or subsistence”185 as well as assisting in the development of those resources.186  
 
At a more fundamental level, a successful Crown-Maori partnership will require a shared 
vision for the future. The responsibility for casting this shared vision falls on the 
shoulders of Maoridom and the Crown. Vital in this process of establishing a strong 
vision for the future is a spirit of partnership where negotiation and deliberation are 
undertaken in good faith, with each partner having an opportunity to speak and to be 
heard and a corresponding duty to listen and to take on board what the other is saying. 
The Diceyan conception of parliamentary sovereignty effectively precludes such a 
process by placing all power in the hands of the Crown and is thus destined to fail in 
achieving a shared vision.  
C   Models for Reform 
It should be noted that this paper aims to open up discussion around the area of 
constitutional reform and the place of the Treaty in New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements. As such, the ideas set out should be seen as embryonic, rather than fully 
formed. Constitutional transformation also requires social transformation. 187  Wider 
education, discussion and deliberation are needed, between Maori themselves, between 
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Maori and the Crown, and also amongst all New Zealanders.188 A considered debate will 
take time. In the meantime consideration should be given to possible interim measures for 
protecting the status of the Treaty as New Zealand’s founding document. 
 
Constitutionally, Crown-Maori relations are at a crossroad and parliamentary sovereignty 
is a barrier that must be addressed. Although the significant gains in the area of Crown-
Maori relations over the last few decades should not be ignored, there is no room for 
complacency. New Zealand’s approach to constitutional development has in the past been 
ad hoc. The preference seems to be to react to events if and when they occur. Although 
such an approach is sometimes pragmatic, it risks damaging rather than enhancing 
Crown-Maori relations,189 a prime example being the hasty enactment of the Foreshore 
and Seabed Act. Piecemeal development is no longer an option if we want to move 
forward as a nation.  
 
The following sections will discuss options for constitutional reform. The report of the 
Constitutional Review Panel commented that, although many submitters passionately 
expressed their visions for the Treaty, detail around how such visions could be achieved 
was lacking. 190  Ideas that seek to fit the Treaty within New Zealand’s current 
constitutional framework have been “relatively well traversed” but options that begin 
with the Treaty/ te Tiriti have received little attention.191 However, the Human Rights 
Commission’s submission to the Panel did focus on the Treaty as a starting point. It put 
forward three scenarios for the role of the Treaty within New Zealand’s constitution.192 
The first scenario views the Treaty as part of New Zealand’s constitutional structure, the 
second views the Treaty as shaping New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements (the 
bicultural model) and the third sees New Zealand’s constitutional obligations as flowing 
from the Treaty (co-existence model). 193  These three views form the basis for the 
following discussion. 
1 The Treaty as Part of New Zealand’s Constitution 
The first model proposed by the Human Rights Commission, which views the Treaty as 
part of New Zealand’s constitution is not dissimilar to the New Zealand’s current 
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approach to giving effect to the Treaty. The principal conception of power remains as 
parliamentary sovereignty.194 Maori customary rights provided for in the Treaty would 
constitute a limit on parliamentary sovereignty. 195  The Human Rights Commission 
submission does comment that some legal and/or constitutional recognition would need 
to be given to the Treaty, although it does not traverse what this would look like.196 Out 
of the three models, this first model would be the easiest to implement, requiring as it 
does little change to existing legal and political institutions. However, the model has 
significant weaknesses that prevent it from creating an environment conducive to 
constitutional transformation. 
 
Greater legal protection of the Treaty through its incorporation into law or constitution 
would make no difference to its current position unless it was entrenched. For example, 
the incorporation of the Treaty into the Bill of Rights would not prevent Parliament from 
making legislation inconsistent with it or simply legislating over it. Parliament’s 
sovereign powers would remain legally unlimited – it being able to “make or unmake any 
law”. As discussed earlier, the untrammeled sovereignty of parliament is a barrier to a 
true Crown-Maori partnership. 
 
Entrenchment of the Treaty/Te Tiriti poses issues of its own. For a start, which text would 
be entrenched? Or should the principles rather than the text itself be entrenched? If that is 
the case – whose principles do we entrench? The Courts, the Waitangi Tribunal and the 
Government each have their own set of Treaty principles. Moreover, the issue of an 
unelected judiciary striking down legislation in New Zealand’s representative democracy 
is likely to make many New Zealander’s uncomfortable to say the least. In 1985 the 
government issued a White Paper that advocated an entrenched Bill of Rights, and Treaty 
of Waitangi, elevating them to the status of supreme law. 197  A large proportion of 
submissions collected after an extensive consultation with the wider public were against 
the proposed entrenchment. The main objection to the proposal was that entrenchment 
would “elevate judicial power over parliamentary power, and be anti-democratic”.198 
These issues are not unique to this model of constitutional reform as the option of 
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entrenching the Treaty/Te Tiriti is not excluded from the bicultural and co-existence 
models as a means to protect its status.  
 
The bigger issue with this approach is that it does not look beyond the confines of the 
Westminster system to seek a solution. The constitutional structure remains essentially 
identical to the colonial model. Though entrenchment would go some way to protect 
Maori rights and enforce Crown obligations, so long as the principal site of power 
remains vested in Parliament it would not actually give effect to the Treaty. The model, in 
seeking a solution fails to reach the heart of the problem. What we need is a constitutional 
transformation of the way that public power is configured and exercised so that power is 
not concentrated in Parliament or shared between Parliament and the courts but is instead 
shared between Maori and the Crown as provided for in the Treaty. Maori would then be 
freed from reliance on Parliament and the Courts, and would be empowered to determine 
their future.    
2 The Bicultural Model 
The bicultural model views the role of Treaty/Te Tiriti as one that shapes New Zealand’s 
constitutional arrangements. The bicultural model is essentially a framework for power 
sharing between the Crown and Maori and as such is conducive to an effective Crown-
Maori partnership. The constitutional narrative informing the model acknowledges the 
original independence and sovereignty of Maori, holding that Rangatira granted powers 
of self-government to the British Crown.199 Rangatira and the Crown decided to develop 
a system of law and governance that recognised and incorporated aspects of each other’s 
laws and systems rather retaining co-existing, separate laws and systems.200 
 
The bicultural model goes further than the first model outlined in that it deals with the 
distribution of powers and governance at a structural level. Unlike the first model, the 
bicultural model removes the barrier of parliamentary sovereignty as opposed to 
attempting to mitigate it. The recognition that New Zealand has two founding cultures, 
not one, is an prerequisite to both social and constitutional change. The Waitangi 
Tribunal pointed out that unless and until “Maori culture and identity are valued in 
everything the government says and does; and unless they are welcomed into the very 
centre” of the running of the country positive change, growth and development as a 
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nation is blocked.201 Following the bicultural model Mana Maori and Crown sovereignty 
would together form the principal concepts of power and would be shared in accordance 
with the Treaty, acknowledging the dual cultures.  
 
Exactly what bicultural governing institutions would look like, and how such institutions 
will be developed is unclear. However, there have been various suggestions for possible 
frameworks. The Treaty Title Bill, put forward by Professor Alex Frame in 2005 
suggested giving the Treaty a legal personality and then establishing bicultural 
institutions to give the Treaty a voice. 202  Such an approach could look similar to 
arrangements provided for in an Agreement in Principle between Whanganui River iwi 
and the Crown.203 The agreement provides for the statutory recognition of the Whanganui 
River as a separate legal entity with its own legal standing and also establishes a body to 
act on its behalf. 204  However, in so far as it requires statutory recognition the 
implementation of such a model would be at the mercy of parliament.  
 
The Anglican Church model provides another possibility in terms of implementing a 
bicultural model. Debate regarding the place of Maori in the Anglican Church of New 
Zealand led to the establishment of a bicultural commission, tasked with investigating the 
possibility of a bicultural framework in the future and advising the General Synod on 
ways in which the church could embody the principles of the Treaty.205 The commission 
recommended the revision of the constitutional structure of the Church to properly reflect 
and give voice to Maori and Pasifika culture.206  The revised constitution, adopted in 
1986, affirmed the Treaty of Waitangi as the basis on which future government and 
settlement of New Zealand was agreed and acknowledged that the “Treaty implies 
partnership between Maori and settlers and bicultural development within one nation”.207 
To give effect to this partnership, the constitution established three houses in the General 
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Synod: Tikanga Maori, Tikanga Pakeha and Tikanga Pasifika.208 The Bishop of Aotearoa 
is the head of the Tikanga Maori house, which is divided into five hui amorangi. Maori in 
the diocese can elect Tikanga Maori or Tikanga Pakeha.209 Bishop Muru Walters believes 
that the Anglican model for a bicultural partnership could be adopted at parliamentary 
level with a similar three-house system in Parliament with a Maori House, a Pakeha 
House and a Treaty House (with a combination of Maori and Pakeha).210  
 
One of the strengths of the Anglican Church model is that decisions are reached by 
consensus of all Tikanga rather than by a majority vote. Bishop Muru Walters comments 
that this decision-making format has provided an opportunity for all sides to have their 
say and notes that they are yet to reach a “stalemate”.211 In the context of the Crown-
Maori partnership, with Pakeha comprising around 77 per cent of the total population and 
Maori only 15 per cent, a tension exists between the democratic principle of majority rule 
and the protection of minority rights.212 It is easy in a representative democracy for the 
majority to ignore or exploit those who form the minority. 213  The Anglican model 
provides a possible answer to this tension. Equality between Maori and the Crown is a 
necessity if a true partnership is to be established. However, not all definitions of equality 
are ‘equal’. The retention of the current liberal democratic definition of equality, with its 
focus on equality of opportunity, is likely to trample on Maori rights as the majority 
‘rules’. A social democratic definition of equality focusing on equality of outcome, like 
that adopted in the Anglican Church would be more conducive to a bicultural partnership 
as one “people” would equate to one vote.214  Thus the interests of those forming the 
majority (those represented by the Crown) would not always trump the interests of the 
Maori minority. 
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The impact of this definition of equality can be seen in the recent debate over water rights 
culminating in the Water Rights case.215 The Waitangi Tribunal’s interim report on the 
National Freshwater and Geothermal Resources claim recommended that the Crown 
further consult with Maori through a national hui in relation to a “shares plus” option 
before implementing its proposal for the sale of shares in MRP.216 The Crown consulted 
groups with a direct interest in the water resources concerned, but the process was rushed 
and the issues discussed were narrow. Although the Supreme Court held that the 
consultation was not shown to be inadequate, the process is illustrative of the importance 
of an equal footing between parties. Equality of outcome would require meaningful 
consultation between parties until a consensus is reached. Equality of opportunity still 
allows for consultation, but it does not require consensus. Thus the more powerful party 
usually wins. That said, requiring parties to reach consensus could also constitute a 
weakness. The risk of reaching a stalemate cannot be discounted. More often than not the 
Crown is operating under time constraints and extensive consultation may not be 
practical.  
 
Another interesting aspect of the Anglican Church constitution is the inclusion of a 
Tikanga Pasifika house. A significant proportion of submissions to the Constitutional 
Advisory Panel viewed the Treaty not only as the foundation for a bicultural partnership 
but also for multiculturalism. For this grouping the Treaty was not only about the 
relationship between Maori and the Crown but also about relationships between Maori 
and all other New Zealand citizens.217 Interestingly, Bishop Walters believes that the 
introduction of Tikanga Pasifika was premature as it has placed strain on the allocation of 
resources and created friction between Tikanga Maori and Tikanga Pasifika.218  New 
Zealand is an increasingly multicultural country. However, the constitutional foundation 
of Crown-Maori relations is not, and has never been, based on race.219 The Crown-Maori 
relationship has its base in the Treaty. 
 
It is important to note that a bicultural partnership, as well as requiring reform of the 
concentration of public power in parliament, will also require reform of law, policies and 
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practices across a broad range of areas. For example, areas such as health, education, 
Maori language, resource management and conservation will need to be adapted to 
incorporate Maori approaches.220 
 
There is a sense in which the bicultural model, while removing the barrier of 
parliamentary sovereignty, seeks to accommodate rather than truly give effect to the 
Treaty. The Constitution itself, as opposed to the Treaty, is the starting point. The Treaty 
molds the shape of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements rather than forming the 
foundation for New Zealand’s constitution, from which all constitutional arrangements 
flow. It follows that the ability of the bicultural model to realise Maori aspirations for 
self-determination or self-government must be questioned.221 The co-existence model as 
an alternative approach leaves more room for the power-sharing arrangements signaled 
by the Treaty.  
3 The Co-existence Model  
The co-existence model views New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements as flowing 
from the Treaty. In this sense, it most closely aligns to the status of the Treaty/Te Tiriti as 
New Zealand’s founding document. Under the co-existence model the two powers – 
mana Maori and Parliamentary sovereignty exist independently of each other. Each 
power “has clearly defined spheres of influence and established processes for working 
together”.222 The constitutional narrative under the co-existence model is similar to that 
put forward by Moana Jackson: Maori granted the Crown the right of kawanatanga or 
governorship over its own people through article one of Te Tiriti and the authority to 
exercise power over Maori remained with iwi.223  
 
Consistent with the right of indigenous peoples to maintain and develop their own 
decision-making institutions contained in the United Nations Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 224  the co-existence model provides an opportunity for Maori to 
establish their own governing institutions. The Maori desire for self-government has long 
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been documented. In 1864 Henry Sewell, New Zealand’s first Premier wrote of the 
“inherent rights of New Zealander’s to govern themselves according to their usages”.225  
 
More research and discussion would be needed in order to determine what form a co-
existence model would take in New Zealand. However, examples of the co-existence 
model can be drawn from New Zealand history, with the Kingitanga and the Kotahitanga 
movements. Templates for forms of self-determination can also be found internationally 
with the Sami Parliaments in Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
 
The Kingitanga movement began in the middle of the 19th century and arose out of the 
recognition of the need for the unification of Maori interests in light of the continuing 
loss of land and increasing tribal warfare.226 After deliberation with major tribes and 
various summit meetings Potatau Te Wherowhero was consecrated King on 2 May 1858, 
marking a new chapter in Maori political organisation.227 The King’s role was “to unite 
the Maori people, to care for Maori interests through Maori principles, by Maori, for 
Maori, with Maori.228 Te Wherowhero’s successor, Tawhiao, established his parliament 
known as Te Kauhanganui. Today the Waikato-Tainui Te Kauhanganui Incorporated 
Society, a body established to administer tribal assets from the Waikato Raupatu Claims 
settlement is widely recognised as Waikato-Tainui’s Parliament.229  
 
In terms of a model for co-existence the Kingitanga faces serious barriers. The 
Kingitanga’s core followers are made up of the inner circle the Tainui Confederation – 
consisting of Waikato, Raukawa, Maniapoto and Hauraki Tribes.230 Although it does 
have some supporters outside of the Tainui confederate the Kingitanga does not have the 
support of all Maori people. In fact, a Nga Puhi leader recently challenged the use of the 
title “Maori King” on the grounds that the king is not the king of all Maori.231 The 
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absence of a single unified Maori body politic adds a layer of complexity when 
examining options for co-existence. However, a separate Maori Parliament, similar to the 
Kotahitanga movement of the 1890’s could operate to unify the Maori population. 
 
Although the Kotahitanga movement was short-lived, it provides a promising framework 
for mana Maori to exist alongside the Crown’s power. The Kotahitanga movement 
endeavoured to unify Maori in to a single pan-tribal group.232 The Kotahitanga movement 
began with the meetings of the Waitangi and Orakei Parliaments in 1889. Both sought the 
unification of Maori and with this focus in mind each signed a separate pledge of 
allegiance to the Kotahitanga movement.233 These pledges later became a mandate for the 
Kotahitanga Parliament. Over 39,000 signatures were gained by 1892 when the 
Kotahitanga Parliament had its first sitting.234 The Kotahitanga consisted of two houses – 
a lower house and an upper house. The upper house was made of up 50 members of 
parliament selected from 96 elected members.235  The country was divided into districts 
where tribal groups could vote for members of the Kotahitanga Parliament. 236  The 
movement ended in 1896 after four failed attempts to gain legal recognition from the 
New Zealand Parliament.237  
 
On the international plane, the Sami Parliaments provide an example of semi-autonomous 
institutions being used to realise indigenous self-determination without threatening the 
territorial integrity of the state.238 The Sami people are indigenous to Samiland, an area 
comprising of the northern-most parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia.239 The 
Sami population, about 70,000 in total, was split when the Nordic countries drew up their 
national borders.240 From the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century the Nordic 
states’ Sami policy, like the New Zealand government’s policy towards Maori, was based 
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on assimilation.241  The first Sami Parliament was established in Finland in 1973. The 
Finnish Constitution recognises Sami people as indigenous people with the right to 
preserve their language and culture in the Finnish Constitution.242  The Act on the Sami 
Parliament, adopted by the Finnish Parliament in 1995, sets out the sphere of the Sami 
Parliament’s powers.243 Under section 5 the Sami Parliament may consider all issues 
concerning the Samis’ language, culture and status as indigenous people”.244 The Act also 
ensures the cultural autonomy of Sami “in matters concerning their language and 
culture”.245 
 
Sami Parliament’s were established in Norway and Sweden in 1989 and 1993 
respectively. The operation of the Sami Parliament in Sweden is controlled by the state. 
An Act of the Swedish Parliaments sets out the purpose of the Sami Parliament as being 
“to monitor issues that relate to Sami culture in Sweden”.246 Although their indigenous 
status is not protected at a constitutional level, the existence of the Sami Parliament 
implies recognition of their special position.247 The Sami Parliament in Norway does not 
have a clear constitutional status. Although it is not controlled by the state it is not fully 
independent. The remit of the Sami Parliament in Norway is arguably the widest of the 
three Sami Parliaments – allowing it to consider everything that affects the Sami 
people.248  
4 Evaluation 
These models each provide a possible way forward for New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements. In doing so one might argue that they raise more questions than they 
answer. However, it must be acknowledged that the constitutional conversation is only 
just beginning. More dialogue and research is needed before any changes can be made. 
This next section briefly addresses some issues raised by the models and also poses new 
questions for further consideration. 
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The differing mandates of the Sami Parliaments raise questions in the New Zealand 
context. Under the co-existence model, each power (mana Maori and Parliamentary 
sovereignty) has defined spheres of influence. How exactly would these spheres of 
influence be defined? Maori in New Zealand could arguably exercise similar powers to 
those exercised by Sami in Finland within existing constitutional arrangements. Thus the 
remit would need to be wider than issues concerning Maori language or culture if any 
meaningful change is to be achieved. Jurisdiction could extend to a parallel criminal 
justice system like that proposed by Moana Jackson over 25 years ago. 249  Whether 
separate institutions would need to be developed for health, education and other similar 
issues will also need to be discussed further. 
 
Given that there is no single unified Maori body politic that can be said to represent all 
Maori, a separate Maori parliament may provide a better vehicle for representation rather 
than simply having a Maori House in Parliament. The Kotahitanga movement occurred 
before the “urban drift” of Maori to larger provincial cities. At the time of the Maori 
Parliament the majority of Maori were still living in rural areas, for the most part in their 
tribal communities where the predominant language was te reo Maori.250 In contrast, 84 
per cent of Maori today live in urban areas.251 In order to make the establishment of a 
separate Maori Parliament a viable option – the exercise of mana Maori must be for the 
advancement of the total Maori population and not just those operating from an iwi 
base.252 The current Maori electorate system could be further developed so that, instead 
of electing representatives for the New Zealand Parliament, representatives are elected to 
a Maori Parliament.253  
 
Further, a coexistence model may be in a better position to address the tension between 
the democracy and the protection of minority rights. As discussed in relation to the 
bicultural model, the equal weighting of votes at elections in multicultural societies 
means that ethnic minorities will always be subject to the will of the constant majority. 
Under the coexistence model Maori will no longer form the constant ethnic minority in 
Parliament. However, an Indigenous Parliament will not necessarily be free from tensions 
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between those forming the majority and minorities. Further, when considering the option 
of a separate Maori Parliament the question of representation of Maori at a national level 
will need to be addressed to ensure that Maori still have a voice in issues affecting New 
Zealanders as a whole. 
 
At first glance, the co-existence model can appear separatist and it could be argued that, if 
the goal is Crown-Maori partnership, the bicultural model is the best fit. However, the 
Crown-Maori partnership is not the goal in itself – it is a vehicle to achieve a bigger goal 
- the advancement of Maori as a people. Currently, the Diceyan conception of 
parliamentary sovereignty operating in New Zealand removes the means for Maori to 
determine their own future. The bicultural model, although a marked improvement to the 
existing arrangements, may still constrict Maori self-government. The co-existence model 
could overcome issues in relation to representation and equality of position faced by the 
bicultural model and provides more room for Maori to self-govern according to their own 
systems and Tikanga rather than a mix of both Maori and European systems.  
 
VII   Interim Measures  
Creating a constitution that gives substantive effect to a Treaty partnership cannot be 
accomplished overnight. As with all good things it will take time. In the interim it is 
recommended that measures be adopted in order to protect the status of the Treaty as 
New Zealand’s founding document, and also to prevent damage to the Crown-Maori 
relationship. Currently, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty threatens to undermine 
any gains made in terms of a Crown-Maori partnership by unilaterally acting in ways 
inconsistent with the Treaty. Interim measures vary from weaker forms of review – such 
as the establishment of a Treaty Committee in Parliament to check bills for consistency 
with the Treaty254  – to stronger forms of review allowing the Court to strike down 
legislation that is inconsistent with the Treaty. Given the importance of the Treaty to New 
Zealand’s constitution, it is suggested that stronger measures are adopted.  
 
A Treaty Committee in Parliament is likely to operate in the same way as the current 
section 7 report works where the Attorney-General checks bills for consistency with the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. However, the most that can be done if inconsistency is found is 
to notify Parliament. Parliament can do what it likes with this notification. Thus such a 
measure is unlikely to be able to protect the Treaty should the need arise.  
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Another option is for Parliament to incorporate both texts of the Treaty/ te Tiriti into 
legislation with the requirement that all law must be developed consistently with the 
Treaty.255 Again, such an Act can do nothing to stop the sovereign Parliament from acting 
in contravention of the Treaty. Making the Treaty supreme law would afford more 
protection to the Treaty and the Crown-Maori relationship. This option could be achieved 
by either including a reference to the Treaty in a supreme Bill of Rights (as proposed by 
in Geoffrey Palmer’s 1985 White Paper)256 or by making the Treaty itself supreme law 
and thus empowering the courts to strike down legislation that is inconsistent with it.257 
Concerns around an unelected judiciary striking down legislation as being undemocratic 
may mean the first option is more desirable. Rather than striking legislation down the 
Court can simply declare it inconsistent with the Treaty – meaning that it would have no 
legal effect.258  
 
VIII  Conclusion 
The Treaty, as the founding document of New Zealand, is the platform on which 
constitutional change should be based and the appropriate starting point for any 
constitutional conversation. As long the starting point for New Zealand’s constitutional 
conversation is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, we are unlikely to see any 
constitutional transformation. The absolute and indivisible nature of parliamentary 
sovereignty operates to prevent any meaningful recognition of the Treaty and as such 
constitutes a barrier to a true Crown-Maori partnership. The current approach of fitting 
the Treaty within the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty not only fails to give effect to 
the Treaty, but also fails to protect Maori as tangata whenua. Removing the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty from the foundation of our constitution could release us from 
“our inherited belief that sovereignty alone underpins law and liberty” and thereby pave 
the way for a more meaningful and effective partnership between the Crown and Maori 
and a more just distribution of power at governance level.259  
 
The aim of this paper is to open up discussion about whether the pervasive doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty should continue to form the foundation of New Zealand’s 
constitutional arrangements. In concluding that we ought to move beyond our colonial 
preoccupation with sovereignty, three Treaty-based models for constitutional reform were 
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proposed. Each model has its own strengths and weaknesses however the coexistence 
model is favoured as it places the Treaty at the foundation of any constitutional 
arrangements. The constitutional debate may benefit from further investigation into 
frameworks for a coexistence model such as the early Kotahitanga movement in New 
Zealand and the Sami Parliaments’ in Finland, Norway and Sweden.   
 
While the models outlined may create more questions than they can answer, it should be 
remembered that the constitutional conversation is just beginning. More discussion, 
deliberation and research is needed. Vital to an informed debate is information regarding 
the history of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, including the constitutional 
arrangements of the Maori world, and the Treaty. The introduction of civic education in 
schools and more accessible information for the public about our current and past 
constitutional arrangements should be a focus going forward to enable citizens to fully 
participate in the constitutional debate.  
 
As we near the 175th year since the signing of the Treaty, the challenge for the Crown and 
Maori is the establishment of a shared vision for New Zealand’s future, a common goal 
that the nation can work towards. Setting a strong direction for the future could determine 
whether New Zealand as a nation moves forward into a new era, or whether we spend the 
next 40 years wandering in the wilderness. The constitutional review provides us with an 
opportunity to break free from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and forge a 
unique constitution based on the Treaty. 
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